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What could the next war look like?
New weapon systems – especially missiles – are changing military realities. Experts believe the next large-scale conflict might be something very different, and warn against planning for the previous war.
Will there even be a recognizable front? Will we have a battlefield in the classic sense of the word? Will it be possible to protect our most important assets?
Ståle Ulriksen, military scientist at Norway’s naval war college in Bergen, grapples with some of the central questions concerning “the next war”. A leading expert on Russia and naval military matters, he still does not believe he has all the answers.
“We can speculate. We can look at capabilities and scenarios. Some things are more probable than others. But at the end of the day, we cannot know how the next major conflict will play out,” Ulriksen says. The examples are many: Napoleon introduced levée en masse (mass conscription) and for a time fielded much larger armies than his opponents. Later, railroads and machine guns would overthrow all previous doctrine. For those who expected armies clashing on battlefields, 1914-1918 came as a shock with its trench warfare. And the next war was radically different again, with mobile tank warfare,” Ulriksen says.
Historically, conflicts between large and powerful states will happen – at least every few generations. And almost every time, they are utterly different from what was expected. Ulriksen – along with his scientist colleague at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Greger Johansson – believes there is a need to analyze what “the next big one” could look like.
“One of the most important changes concerns missiles. Their range has been increasing substantially for years. We expect that to continue. They have become more precise, and several countries – among them Russia – have stockpiled significant amounts of them,” says Greger Johansson.
An AMRAAM-Extended Range missile is fired from a NASAMS launcher. Could missiles be a game changer in future conflicts? Photo: Raytheon.
HIDING IN CAVES FOR THREE DAYS?
Long-range missiles are one thing, but can be seen as part of a bigger picture as well. Both in the West and in Russia there has been a drive toward long-range artillery, too. At the same time, sensor and control systems have improved. Altogether, a future conflict could involve players with plenty of capability to strike targets precisely, from long ranges. What happens when everyone can do that?
“That’s a hard question to answer. We could be looking at an initial phase, maybe three days or so – where everyone fires off what they have. That would be a phase where thousands of missiles and other long-range efforts try to destroy opponents’ most important assets: military bases, command and control centers, infrastructure like power plants, and so on,” says Ståle Ulriksen.
What’s a good defense in such a case?
“We could be back to one of the central Cold War tenets: hide in a cave for a while. Unless we have incredibly good (and numerous) air defense systems, it’s hard to defend against incoming swarms of missiles,” Ulriksen says.
“Using well-protected bases, hidden deep inside mountains, is one of the few effective ways to preserve your forces, but identified entryways are likely to be targeted,” Johansson agrees. The other philosophy is to be able to disperse rapidly, but that is very time critical and labor intensive for a defender given a short alert notice.
Ståle Ulriksen argues that an initial phase could possibly see most missiles being used. After that, conventional forces – involved in a classic war of attrition – could once again rise to pre-eminence. Both sides would still need land forces: tanks, soldiers, artillery, etc. An attacker would need them to exploit a situation where missiles have disabled an opponent’s most important defensive assets. A defender would need them to fight back on the ground and prevent loss of territory.
Aircraft carriers are capable of significant power projection, and played an important role in World War II. But what happens when they encounter an opponent who has massed long-range anti-ship missiles? Photo: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jake Greenberg
“Missiles do change a lot. They can be exceedingly effective against high-value targets. Carrier groups, air bases, oil platforms, and so on. They also – possibly – can change the entire strategic situation in a war. Just the existence of weapon systems that can strike anywhere, anytime, against any target in whole countries… What would happen to the concepts of a battlefield and a front?” However, Ulriksen by no means considers missiles omnipotent. He recalls the NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999. After three days of bombing, almost all the strategic military targets were destroyed. Yet the Yugoslav (Serb) army kept on fighting. “They tricked NATO into wasting missiles on worthless targets, and after 78 days the Serb forces left Kosovo almost intact.” Nevertheless, he argues missiles can be eminently usable – and have changed much over the last 20 years: “They can be very effective against high-value targets.”
LOW-TECH RESILIENCE
Expensive, high-value targets like carriers or large amphibious ships are obvious missile goals: they can be sunk, or forced by the missile threat to move out of the area of operations. Even a remote possibility of being destroyed by a missile costing thousands or a few million can be an Achilles heel for ships or planes costing billions. Both Ulriksen and Johansson believe a stronger emphasis on volume, low-tech, cheaper and more resilient units could be a possible answer. Against less costly units in greater numbers, missiles would be relatively weaker. What would an attacker do when facing, say, dispersed army vehicles in substantial numbers, each costing less than a missile?
And what if there was a significant ability to replace losses, and a will to fight on?
Johansson goes so far as to describe resilience – the ability to take a beating and still continue the fight – as the most important trait for a defending force. Ståle Ulriksen agrees.
“I’ve come to the conclusion that the most important aspect of a weapon system isn’t necessarily the firepower, but its resilience and robustness. We cannot use ‘glass cannons’ that break soon after engaging an opponent or that can be easily neutralized. A lot of countries have invested heavily in very costly systems that can do a lot of damage in a short time. But what do you do when they’re gone? Take the combat aircraft, the F-35 for example: while in the air they are very powerful, on the ground they can be vulnerable. They must be provided with safe and robust bases to be able to operate effectively. My impression is that many countries have bought these extremely capable weapon platforms, but have put less emphasis on the whole support system around the platform. If this is neglected, these assets can be lost quite quickly.”
”The Battle of Austerlitz, 2 December 1805” painting shows one of Napoleon’s greatest victories. The french used a revolutionary concept of mass conscription (Levee en masse) to field bigger armies than before. Combined with other new concepts, among them great manoeuverability and new ways to use artillery, they dominated European battlefields for a time. Their opponents were in many ways unprepared.
FIRST STRIKE ADVANTAGE
Both researchers also worry about the huge advantage a first strike gives to the party that initiates armed conflict.
“The surprise factor could be extremely important. If the transition from peace, where no one believes in armed conflict, to war is short enough, it would immensely favor an attacker.
Missiles could destroy important infrastructure quickly and at a low cost. Then there is only one question, really: does the defender have the resilience, the strategic depth, the backup and the will to fight back? I’m afraid a lot of Western countries may not have these today.
That being said, the recent Trident Juncture exercise was an impressive show of NATO unity,” says Greger Johansson.
His fellow researcher Ståle Ulriksen has spent years analyzing Russian capabilities, and concludes that their military is set up with strengths matching some of the West’s weaknesses: with a considerable missile capacity and troops that can move quickly over large distances, Russia could exploit an early advantage effectively.
“This is what we see when we look at their forces. But the Russian ability to operate over a longer time period, their resiliency? I would say it’s rather poor. We end up with a situation where a first strike followed by ground operations – a quick land grab or a hybrid operation – could be followed by a fait accompli (something that’s already happened, a fact on the ground that can no longer be prevented).
The cost of fighting back – and do not forget Russia could threaten to use its nuclear arsenal at this point – would be very high,” Ulriksen reasons.
“I believe we could be going back to a phase where the classic conventional forces would become very important. Any armed forces would have to have them, not to the exclusion of missiles or other such systems, but in addition to. Culture, mentality and the will to fight are also paramount,” Johansson concludes.
The tank made it possible to use mobile warfare again in World War 2, after a static World War 1. Again, most military planners were unprepared. Picture: An american tank in action.
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